MISSING THE MARK(ET)
IN SITING HAZARDOUS

WASTE FACILITIES
James T. Hamilton

Siting a hazardous waste facility under
current state and federal regulatory regimes

Involves an extensive process of public examination that few facilities survive. In a na-

tionwide survey conducted in 1987, New
York's Legislative Commission on Toxic
Substances and Hazardous Waste found
that of eighty-one recent siting applications
for commercial firms that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste (TSDs), thirty-one
had been denied or withdrawn, thirty-six
were still under review, and fourteen had received permits under the Resource 1Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Of the
fourteen approved permits, however, six
had not been implemented because of market circumstances or reversals during judicial
review. 2 State hazardous waste officials surveyed In 1987 listed public pressure as the
number one reason for the rejection of
commercial TSD sitings. They reported that
public opposition had stopped fifty-two percent of the commercial facilities that were
rejected. (The next most likely reason for
failure was technical design problems, which
accounted for thirty-eight
percent of the siting rejections.)3 Neighborhood opposition
to facilities that treat hazardous waste
springs from a variety of public concerns:
threats to property values, odors and nuisances posed by the facility's operation, and
health and safety concerns about accidental
releases of hazardous waste, such as local
groundwater
contamination from a dump
4
site.
Ronald Coase's often cited article, The
Problem of Social Cost, provides one explanation for why a firm that generates pollution
would have to consider the negative effects
of Its emissions on surrounding neighbors.5
Consider a world where property rights are
fully defined, transaction costs are zero, and
people enjoy the right to be free of pollution.

In such a world, a firm choosing its location
realizes that it will have to pay surrounding
neighbors for the "right" to pollute. In trying
to minimize its future liabilities for pollution in
Its location decision, the firm will take into account the physical and demographic charac-

teristics of the surrounding neighborhood
that will influence the "cost" of the externalities generated by the firm: the number of
people affected, local incomes, vulnerability
of property values, and residents' willingness to pay for environmental amenities.
The firm will act as if it were calculating the.
potential damages associated with each of
its locations, for it knows that once it locates
and generates pollution it will have to negotiate with and pay compensation to each affected party. Thus, holding other factors
constant, the ideal location for the firm will be
a liability minimizing neighborhood characterized by low population densities, incomes
and property values.
Coase never intended his arguments in
The Problem of Social Cost to be a description of how the world actually operates. He
rather intended his model to lead people to
ask why actual outcomes, such as the location of firms generating pollution, diverge
from those predicted in a world of zero transactiQn costs.8 Yet the spirit of the Coase
Theorem lives on in proposals to ease the
impasse in siting hazardous waste facilities
by creating an explicit market. 7 Under such
proposals, firms would offer communities
willing to host commercial TSDs explicit
compensation to offset the perceived dangers and potential stigma associated with
hosting such a facility. Communities would
announce through a negotiation and bidding process the amount of compensation
they would demand in order to host the
waste site. Such compensation would take
the form of specific donations by the firm to
the community, profit shares in the dump,
tax revenues linked to the quantity of waste
handled, or provision of services to the
community. The intended result: the firm locates where its damage Is the least because
that is where the compensation figure announced by the community will be the least.
As of 1987, at least fourteen states had
instituted formal mechanisms to provide
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communities with economic incentives to
host such noxious facilities.8
Though the negotiation and bidding
strategy may appear to solve the problems
created by an absent market in location
rights, the real world of politics will still fail to
replicate the outcomes predicted by the
Coase Theorem for at least three reasons.
First, communities vary in the extent to which
their residents express their political opinions through collective action. Opposition to
the potential siting of a commercial hazardous waste facility is thus a product of two
factors: the potential compensation that individuals in the community would demand in
order to accept a TSD, and the compensation demand actually expressed by the residents' collective action. Creating local opposition groups to stop a facility siting, lobbying company officials, and participating in forums such as county zoning boards or state
siting commissions are actions residents can
take to raise the potential location costs of a
firm. Thus, to the degree that communities
vary in their ability to overcome the problems
of collective action, such as the tendency of
individuals to sit back and "free ride" on the
efforts of others, the amount of opposition
expressed to a firm's siting depends a great
deal on the political skills and abilities within
the respective communities. Second, the
degree to which the public officials involved
in the negotiating process actually translate
the interests of their constituents into compensation demands may result In a divergence from the Coasian outcome. Finally,
the failure of the relevant political markets to
overlap with the economic markets involved
in the operation of commercial hazardous
waste facilities may mean that the political
community that demands the least compensation may not be the location where the firm
generates the least externalities. 9
POLITICS AND SOCIAL COSTS
There are many problems associated
with translating the metaphor of the auction
market into public policies in which communities compete for the compensation offered
for hosting a hazardous waste facility. Many
of these problems arise because, while individuals have preferences, "communities" do
not. If a firm could negotiate costlessly with
each of the individuals threatened by the
risks of pollution associated with a hazardous
waste facility, then the Coase Theorem's

predictions would hold true. In the actual
siting process, however, translating the
interests of the residents of a community
into compensation demands from a firm
involves action through the political process.
Because neighborhoods vary in the degree
to which they engage in collective action, a
locating firm, in addition to considering the
potential environmental damages that would
be generated by its facility, will also take into
account whether a community can
successfully engage in collective action to
exercise its property rights to compensation.
Given the importance of public opposition in
determining the success of a siting proposal,
firms should consider the potential for
political activity as a separate factor In their
decisions as to which areas to target for
proposed facilities.
Among the clearest evidence of the Importance of the potential for collective action
in siting decisions of LULUs ("locally undesirable land uses") is a report prepared in
1984 for the California Waste Management
Board. 10 As part of a multivolume study of
how to locate waste-to-energy plants In the
state (prepared at a time when only 3 of 29
planned publicly-owned waste-to-energy
facilities had progressed to the siting phase
of the project because of public complaints),
the California board commissioned a report
entitled "Political Difficulties Facing Wasteto-Energy Conversion Plant Siting." Excerpts from the report reveal that a neighborhood's likelihood of engaging In political
opposition has become an explicit siting factor:
A great deal of time, resources, and
plannitig could be saved and political problems avoided, if people who
are resentful and people who are
amenable to Waste-to-Energy projects could be identified before selecting a site. If this information was
available, facilities could be placed In
areas, if technically feasible, where
people do not find them so offensive. 11
Since the 1970s, political criteria
have become every bit as Important
In determining the outcome of a
project as engineering factors. The
introduction of political criteria significantly complicates the task for the
simple reason that political criteria
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often are at odds with engineering
concerns. The best site in terms of
financial feasibility and geologic
suitability may very well be the most
troublesome politically. 12
Another problem in expressing the aggregation of individuals' compensation demands through the political process stems
from the relationship between representatives and their constituents, a principal-agent
relationship much like that between management and shareholders. In the bidding
among communities, it is uncertain whose
compensation demands will be announced
by public officlals and who actually will receive the benefits. In highly competitive districts where representatives' actions are policed by party competition, representatives
may speak for those constituents whose
support Is essential to reelection, who may
or may not be the residents affected directly
by the siting of the hazardous waste facility.
In areas where electoral scrutiny is more lax
or barriers to entry by political challengers are
steep, the compensation provided by noxious facilities may flow directly to the public
officials In the forms of political donations or
contracts for consulting and legal work.
Even if representatives are fully attentive
to the Interests of their constituents, the failure of political markets to overlap perfectly
with the economic markets involved in siting
Hazardous waste facilities represents a
problem for envisioned siting competitions
among communities. One phenomenon
evident In the location of NIMBY ("not-in-mybackyard') facilities is the tendency of pollcymakers to place them on the extreme borders of their localities so that the potential
harms from their operation fall in large part on
residents who are not their constituents. A
more subtle externality problem may occur
when the political action of one group of
residents In an area ends up "protecting"
neighborhoods willing to host a facility.
Consider the case where those residents
immediately surrounding a proposed site are
willing to accept compensation for the location of a waste facility. Other residents of the
county who are not physically threatened by
pollution from the facility, but who are concerned about environmental protection in
general or the stigma of being a regional
dumping ground, may actively oppose the
siting. If the residents who are directly affected are unable to organize as well as less
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affected residents, then political action may
block the facility from locating in the area
where it generates the fewest externalities.

EVIDENCE OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION
Testing theories about the relationship
between neighborhood characteristics and
facility location is often difficult, for the question emerges whether a facility's operation in
an area has changed the characteristics of
the neighborhood. For example, when a
hazardous waste facility is located in a low income area, is this because that is where
property values and compensation demands
were low? Or is this because a firm located in
the area, property prices dropped as the

environment became degraded, and low income residents willing to trade environmental quality for reduced housing prices moved
into the neighborhood? One way to avoid
this problem of separating the effects of a
facility on a neighborhood is to look at
planned expansions of hazardous waste facilities. The facilities may not have announced their expansion plans, so that
property values will have not reacted to the
potential hazards posed. Using the Freedom of Information Act, I obtained the results
of a 1987- EPA survey of firms that treat or
dispose of hazardous waste that included
firms' planned changes in capacity for 19871992.13 This allowed me to test theories
about the location of NIMBY facilities by exploring the following question: of those
counties that currently have commercial hazardous waste facilities, what factors determine whether the county is targeted for a net
expansion in processing capacity in firms'
plans for 1987-92?
Economic theories of firm location indicate in part what factors a commercial hazardous waste facility considers in the decision of whether to expand in a given area.
These factors include input costs such as
land prices, the relative demand for hazardous waste treatment by local facilities that
generate such pollution, and the capacity of
its competitors to supply waste processing
services. In addition, the firm should consider the compensation demands arising
from its location ina particular neighborhood.
These can be calculated in part as the expected costs the firm would face from suits
arising out of liability for damage to physical
structures and effects on human health.
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The firm may also take into account the demographic variables associated with environmentalism, so that areas where people
place a high value on environmental amenities are avoided. Thus the higher the Income, education levels, and property values
in a given area, the less likely a firm concerned about potential compensation for
pollution would be to locate in that area.
Since expressing opposition to firm siting
entails action through the political process,
the firm would also consider the potential for
collective action to translate compensation
demands into effective opposition to the
firm's siting.
In order to test the location theories outlined above, I examined how the probability
of a county's selection as a site for capacity
expansion varied as a function of the current
local hazardous waste processing capacity,
the generation of hazardous waste by facilities in the area, and the characteristics of the
county associated with higher compensation
values (such as resident incomes, average
house values, and education levels). To capture the influence of variations in political activity among areas in the site selections of
the commercial waste processors, I added
another variable to the model of firm location:
the percentage of county residents eighteen and older who voted in the 1980 presidential election. This variable was included
not because firms would necessarily estimate the voter turnouts in areas they targeted for facility expansion, Rather, the variable is meant to proxy the potential for collective action, on the assumption that areas
which the firms would consider especially
active In politics would thus be identified in
the model because they would also tend to
be areas with higher voting rates.14 Of the
156 counties in the EPA survey that had
commercial hazardous waste facilities in operation in 1986, seventy-two were targeted
for net expansion in processing capacity In
the firms' plans for 1987-92.
Analysis of the determinants of the firms'
capacity decisions reveals the influence of
both economic and political factors. In the
models estimating the probability that a
county with commercial hazardous waste
processing capacity in 1986 would be selected for additional capacity construction in
1987-92, the higher the current capacity
surplus (defined as the difference between
the maximum available capacity for process-

ing hazardous waste and the amount of capacity actually utilized) In the area, the less
likely are firms to plan additional construction
in the area. Similarly, the greater the amount
of manufacturing In the county (and hence
the greater potential for waste generation
and the demand for waste processing services), the higher the probability that an area
would be selected for capacity expansion.
Most striking, however, Is the result that
even after differences In area Incomes, education levels, and property values are taken
into account, the higher the voter turnout In
the 1980 elections, the lower the likelihood
that commercial hazardous waste firms would
target an area for expansion. When the
question of which factors lead to a net reduction of commercial hazardous waste processing is examined, a similar result
emerges. The higher the voter turnout rate
in an area, the more likely that firms within the
county will reduce their processing capacity.
These results indicate that firms do consider
the potential for collective action in deciding
where to operate. The higher the potential
for political opposition in a given community
which today has a commercial hazardous
waste facility In operation, the lower the odds
that the community will be selected as a site
for additional processing capacity, and the
greater the chances that firms will decide to
shut down processing capacity In the area in
the future.
The influence of potential political opposition on the capacity plans of commercial
hazardous waste facilities for 1987-92 marks
a change from the common law siting regime
in operation during the 1970s. Prior to the
emergence of Love Canal (1978) and the
passage of the Superfund Act In 1980, the
dangers associated with commercial facilities
from groundwater contarrtnation were less
appreciated by the public and harder to remedy through the courts because of the dilfllculties In pursuing toxic torts claims. As public perceptions of the dangers posed by
waste facilities Increased, however, political
opposition became more of a determinant In
the siting decisions of firms. If one compares
the probability that a county would be selected in the 1970s as a site for a new hazardous waste facility with the probability that
the county would be a target for net capacity
expansion in the later era, the changes reveal the increasing Importance of Coaslan
compensation demands and political opposition in the siting process. The greater the
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resident incomes and education levels in a
county, the lower its probability of selection
for hazardous waste processing capacity in
the late 1980s, relative to the regime of the
1970s. Similarly, the higher the voter
turnout in the area, the lower the probability
the county would be chosen for capacity expansion In 1987-92, relative to its selection
probability in the 1970s. Thus, hazardous
waste firms during the 1970s selected their
locations with less regard to compensation
demands and political opposition than in the
current era of greater regulatory and public
scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
If the world truly resembled the land of
zero transaction costs described in Coase's
The Problem of Social Costs, then the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities would be much simpler. Other things
being equal, the firm would end up locating
where the damages from its pollution were
the least because that is where the negotiated compensation demands would be the
least. Yet, since opposition to firm location
and expression of compensation demands
come through the political process, differences in neighborhoods' abilities to organize and engage in political activity
become important. As the evidence from
the siting plans of commercial hazardous
waste facilities for 1987-92 indicates, firms
do consider variations in the potential for
political opposition in their selection of
where to expand or reduce hazardous waste
processing. Thus, firms may end up locating
where the opposition expressed is the least,
though this may not be where the damage of
their externalities Is the least.
Current state statutes and proposals for
changes In the siting process often aim at
making property rights more explicit through
specific procedures of negotiation and compensation in the siting of NIMBY facilities.
The process of counties battling in the siting
process is portrayed as a market for location
in which the firm ends up choosing the site
where the sum of its economic and political
costs are the least. The operation of such a
market, however, depends in part on the
translation of individual demands through
the political process and the concomitant
problems of collective action and representation. In the Coasian world, if property rights
are fully defined they will flow to their most

highly valued use.
ever, even if rights
no guarantee they
operation depends

In a political world, howare fully defined there is
will be exercised if their
upon collective action.
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